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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Arbitration agreements are essentially contracts that 
predetermine that a dispute between parties will be decided by 
an arbitrator, rather than in court.  In response to judicial 
hostility toward these types of contracts, Congress passed the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.  The FAA 
places certain arbitration agreements on equal footing with all 
other contracts by requiring courts to enforce such agreements 
according to their terms.  Section 2 provides that the FAA 
covers “a written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” id. § 
2, but a provision in § 1 sets an outer limit, providing that 
“nothing” in the FAA “shall apply to contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” id. § 1 (“§ 1”).  
This outer limit sets the stage for the case before us. 
 Jaswinder Singh brought this putative class action in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, on behalf 
of himself, and other similarly situated New Jersey Uber 
drivers.  He alleged that Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) 
misclassified them as independent contractors as opposed to 
employees, which resulted in their being deprived of overtime 
compensation, and having to incur business expenses for the 
benefit of Uber.  Uber removed the case to federal court in the 
District of New Jersey.  It then moved for the District Court to 
dismiss the case and compel Singh to have it decided by an 
arbitrator, on the basis of an agreement to arbitrate.  Singh 
opposed the motion to compel arbitration on numerous 
grounds, one of which was that the District Court did not have 
the authority to compel arbitration under the FAA.  He argued 




within the ambit of the residual clause—the “any other class of 
workers” portion—of § 1.  In the least, Singh asked that he be 
given the opportunity for discovery on the essential § 1 residual 
clause inquiry, which is whether the class of workers to which 
Singh belongs is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”  
Id.     
 The District Court granted the motion over Singh’s 
objections.  But it did not reach the engaged-in-interstate 
commerce inquiry.  Instead, the Court ruled that Singh did not 
fall within the ambit of the residual clause of § 1 because that 
clause only extends to transportation workers who transport 
goods, not those who transport passengers.  We disagree with 
this reading.  Consistent with our longstanding precedent, we 
hold that the residual clause of § 1 may extend to a class of 
transportation workers who transport passengers, so long as 
they are engaged in interstate commerce or in work so closely 
related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.  We will 
therefore vacate the District Court’s order compelling 
arbitration.  In addition, because neither the Complaint nor 
incorporated documents suffice to resolve the engaged-in-
interstate-commerce inquiry, we will remand this and the 
remaining issues to the District Court for further proceedings 




 The FAA “place[s] arbitration agreements on equal 
footing with all other contracts” by requiring courts to “enforce 
[such] agreements according to their terms.”  McDonald v. 
Cashcall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2018) (first 




provides that, like any other contract, arbitration agreements 
may be rendered unenforceable by grounds that exist at law or 
in equity for revocation.  See id.; 9 U.S.C. § 2.  To the extent 
that a particular ground implicates the threshold question of 
whether the parties are bound by an agreement to arbitrate, it 
is referred to as a gateway question of arbitrability and is 
typically resolved in court.  Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. 
Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 756 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 Although this is the typical route, the parties may 
contract around it, and agree to have even these questions 
decided by an arbitrator.  To do so, the arbitration agreement 
need only include a clause—a delegation clause—that reserves 
arbitrability questions for an arbitrator to decide.  Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70, 72 (2010) 
(“Rent-A-Center”).  Where such a clause is included, courts 
cannot decide threshold questions of arbitrability “unless a 
party challenge[s] the delegation clause [specifically] and the 
court concludes that the delegation clause is not enforceable.”  
MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 226 (citations omitted).  The rationale 
is that a delegation clause is severable from the underlying 
arbitration agreement such that it is separately entitled to FAA-
treatment—that is, unless specifically (and successfully) 
challenged, the clause is in and of itself treated as a valid 
contract that must be enforced under the FAA’s enforcement 
provisions.  See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72.   
 All of this, of course, assumes that the FAA controls.  
But what if it does not?  Or, more precisely, who gets to decide 
the question of whether the FAA applies where there is a 
delegation clause?  During the pendency of this appeal, the 
Supreme Court answered this question, holding that courts 




excluded from FAA coverage even where there is a delegation 
clause.  New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 538 (2019).   
 Specifically, §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA identify the subset 
of arbitration agreements covered by the statute.  Since they 
come before the FAA’s enforcement clauses under §§ 3 and 
4—which authorize a court to stay a proceeding and compel 
arbitration—the Supreme Court reasoned that §§ 3 and 4 
cannot apply to an arbitration agreement that is excluded from 
the FAA’s coverage by the terms of §§ 1 and 2.  Id. at 537–38.  
Pursuant to the rationale offered by Rent-A-Center, the Court 
viewed a delegation clause as “merely a specialized type of 
arbitration agreement,” and, as a result, held that the same 
reasoning applied.  Id. at 538. 
 This background sets the stage for our case:  the contract 
between the parties contains an arbitration provision and a 
delegation clause.  If the contract is covered by the FAA, these 
provisions might combine to require the parties to have much 
of their dispute resolved by an arbitrator.  However, the parties 
disagree over whether their contract is excluded from the FAA 
under the residual clause of § 1.   
B. Procedural 
 
1. Proceedings in the District Court 
 Singh brought this putative class action in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, on behalf of himself 
and other similarly situated New Jersey Uber drivers.  He 
alleged that Uber misclassified them as independent 
contractors as opposed to employees, and that, as a result, Uber 
deprived them of overtime compensation, and required them to 




the action to federal court in the District of New Jersey.  It then 
moved to dismiss the action and compel arbitration pursuant to 
the arbitration provision of an agreement between the parties 
called the Rasier Software Sublicense Agreement (“Rasier 
Agreement”). 
 In response to the motion, Singh argued that there was 
no valid agreement between Uber and him, and, even if there 
was, he was not bound by its arbitration provision for four 
reasons:  (1) Uber failed to meet its burden to show that the 
provision was a constitutional waiver of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial; (2) the provision is excluded 
under the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA; (3) the provision 
violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the New Jersey Wage and Hour 
Law (“NJWHL”); and (4) the provision was unconscionable. 
 As to the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA specifically, 
Singh argued that he had at least put forth enough to warrant 
discovery on the question.  He relied on our decision in 
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 
764 (3d Cir. 2013), to support this argument.  There, we 
recognized that our precedents suggested two possible 
standards under which a motion to compel arbitration could be 
decided—the motion to dismiss standard or the summary 
judgment standard.  Id. at 771–72.  The two differ significantly, 
as we accept as true the facts established by the pleadings—the 
complaint and incorporated documents—when deciding the 
former, but, for the latter, we require the party opposing the 
motion to submit evidence, which is typically obtained through 
discovery.  See id. at 772 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)).   
 We held that the motion to dismiss standard applies to a 




“subject to an enforceable arbitration clause”—that is, where 
the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate between the 
parties is apparent from the face of the complaint or 
incorporated documents.  Id. at 774, 776.  “But if the complaint 
and its supporting documents are unclear” as to whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate, “or if the plaintiff has responded to 
a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient 
to place the agreement” in dispute, a “restricted inquiry into 
factual issues [is] necessary . . . .”  Id. at 774–75 (emphases 
added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The 
motion to compel arbitration is judged under a summary 
judgment standard if it is renewed after this inquiry.  Id. at 775.   
 Uber asked the Court to reject this request for discovery 
on the grounds that the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA only 
applies to transportation workers that transport goods, the 
parties’ agreement states that the FAA would govern, and that, 
even if the FAA did not govern, the result would be the same 
under the New Jersey Arbitration Act (“NJAA”), N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2A:23B-1 to -32.  In addition, Uber put forth that the 
parties’ agreement contained a valid delegation clause, which, 
unless successfully challenged, required that all the issues 
Singh raised regarding the validity of their arbitration 
agreement—including the § 1 residual clause issue—be 
decided by an arbitrator. 
 The District Court ruled in Uber’s favor, without 
addressing the discovery or delegation clause arguments.   
 It recognized that the parties had “agree[d] to have 
[threshold issues] decided by an arbitrator through the 
inclusion of a delegation clause within the arbitration 
agreement,” App. 7, but nonetheless proceeded to address four 




delegation clause was valid, that the parties had in fact entered 
into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement, and that the 
residual clause of § 1 of the FAA does not extend to 
transportation workers who transport passengers.  It also found 
that the arbitration provision did not violate the NLRA or the 
other labor-related statutes, and was not unconscionable.  It did 
not decide whether the parties’ dispute fell within the scope of 
the arbitration provision, on the basis that the delegation clause 
required that this determination be “reserved for the arbitrator.”  
App. 28.   
2. Proceedings on Appeal 
 Singh appealed the District Court’s § 1 determination, 
its determination that the arbitration provision did not violate 
the NJWHL, its failure to address his Seventh Amendment 
argument, and its rulings on unconscionability.1  In its response 
brief on appeal, Uber primarily argued that Singh had waived 
any issue as to the enforceability of the delegation clause, and, 
as such, all of the issues Singh raises on appeal must be decided 
by an arbitrator.  Given New Prime, Uber now concedes that a 
court has to resolve Singh’s § 1 argument as an antecedent 
matter.   
                                                 
 1 After the District Court’s decision, the Supreme Court 
issued a ruling that foreclosed Singh’s NLRA and Norris-
LaGuardia Act arguments.  In particular, the Supreme Court 
held that the NLRA fell short of reflecting a clear and manifest 
intent by Congress to displace the FAA, and that, “just as under 
the NLRA, the [Norris-LaGuardia Act] does not conflict with 
Congress’s directions favoring arbitration.”  See Epic Sys. 




 Section 1 of the FAA requires that we determine 
whether the agreement between Singh and Uber qualifies as a 
“contract[] of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 1.  Of course, there is no dispute as to 
whether Uber drivers like Singh are seamen or railroad 
employees.  Rather, the dispute centers on § 1’s residual 
clause—the “any other class of workers” portion—with Uber 
arguing that the agreement between it and Singh does not 
qualify as a “contract of employment,” Appellee Resp. Br. 19–
20, and, even if it did, Singh does not belong to a class of 
workers engaged in interstate commerce because such drivers 
transport passengers, and not goods, and they do so “only 
locally,” Appellee Resp. Br. 20–26.  New Prime eliminated 
Uber’s “contract of employment” argument, see New Prime, 
139 S.Ct at 541 (“Congress used the term ‘contracts of 
employment’ in a broad sense to capture any contract for the 
performance of work by workers.” (emphasis in original)), so 
we are left with its transportation-of-goods and “engaged in 
interstate commerce” arguments.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1453, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s order 
compelling arbitration de novo, since it presents a question of 
law.  Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 
100 n. 61 (3d Cir. 2018).  We apply the same standard as the 
District Court, so “we are first obliged to determine which 





A. The Framework for Deciding Which Standard 
 Recall that the two options are the motion to dismiss 
standard under Rule 12(b)(6) and the summary judgment 
standard under Rule 56, and that we set forth a framework for 
determining which should apply to a motion to compel 
arbitration in Guidotti.  The centerpiece of that framework is 
whether the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate is 
apparent from the face of the complaint or incorporated 
documents.  Id. at 774–76. 
 This is so because it represents a balancing of the 
competing purposes of the FAA by fostering “efficient and 
speedy dispute resolution” tempered by the “important aim” of 
“enforc[ing] . . . private agreements” and the “significant role 
courts play in interpreting the validity and scope of contract 
provisions . . . .”  Id. at 773 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Notably, juxtaposed with Congress’s 
“declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), § 4 of the FAA establishes that a court must be 
“satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
failure to comply therewith is not in issue” before “mak[ing] 
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .”  9 
U.S.C. § 4.  Thus, we determined that the interest in speedy 
resolution needs no tempering where “the affirmative defense 
of arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a complaint” 
(or incorporated documents).  Id. at 773–74 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  However, we recognized that “a 
more deliberate pace is required” where the motion “does not 
have as its predicate a complaint with the requisite clarity” as 
to whether “the parties agreed to arbitrate.”  Id. at 774 (internal 




 A similar balancing is required with respect to the issue 
presented here.  Indeed, like the agreement-to-arbitrate issue 
posed in § 4 of the FAA, the applicability of the residual clause 
of § 1 is not merely “presumed to be [a] question[] for judicial 
determination.”  See id. at 773 (citation omitted).  Rather, New 
Prime establishes that a court must be satisfied that this clause 
does not apply before making an order that the parties proceed 
to arbitration pursuant to §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA.  We therefore 
determine that a “restricted inquiry” may be necessary to 
resolve a motion to compel arbitration that presents an issue 
regarding the applicability of the residual clause of § 1.   
 Specifically, where the issue of whether the residual 
clause of § 1 of the FAA applies arises in a motion to compel 
arbitration, the motion to dismiss standard applies if the 
complaint and incorporated documents provide a sufficient 
factual basis for deciding the issue.  But where those 
documents do not, or the plaintiff responds to the motion with 
additional facts that place the issue in dispute, “the parties 
should be entitled to discovery on the question of arbitrability 
before a court entertains further briefing . . . ,” with an 
application of the summary judgment standard to follow.  Id. 
at 776 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
B. Standard Applied by the District Court 
 Here, the District Court’s view was that the residual 
clause of § 1 of the FAA does not extend to transportation 
workers who transport passengers.  So, to decide the § 1 
residual clause inquiry, the fact that Uber drivers transport 
passengers need only have been apparent from the face of the 
Amended Complaint, from an exhibit attached to the Amended 




incorporated or explicitly relied upon in the Amended 
Complaint.  See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 772.  Setting aside the 
affidavit submitted by Uber as not qualifying as any of these, 
the Amended Complaint and the Rasier Agreement each 
independently establish that Uber drivers transport passengers.  
See, e.g., Amended Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 7 (“Defendant offers 
customers the ability to hail a car service driver via a mobile 
application.” (emphasis added)); Rasier Agreement, App. 42 
(characterizing Uber drivers as “providers of . . .  peer-to-peer 
. . . passenger transportation services . . .”) (emphasis added)).  
Along those lines, the affidavit submitted by Singh in his 
response to Uber’s motion does not place this issue in dispute, 
but further establishes that Uber drivers transport passengers.  
See, e.g., Singh Decl. ¶ 28 (“I regularly picked up customers . 
. .”). 
 We therefore view the District Court’s decision as 
applying a motion to dismiss standard on the issue of whether 
the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA applies to transportation 
workers that transport passengers.     
III. DISCUSSION 
 For our part, as we alluded to, whether the residual 
clause of § 1 applies in this case and operates to exclude the 
Rasier Agreement (including the arbitration provision and 
delegation clause) from FAA coverage is really a two-part 
inquiry asking (1) if § 1 only applies to transportation workers 
who transport goods, or also those who transport passengers, 
and (2) whether Singh belongs to a class of workers that are 
engaged in interstate commerce.  The latter question is reached 




 (A) We part company with the District Court and so 
answer:  the residual clause of § 1 is not limited to 
transportation workers who transport goods, but may also 
apply to those who transport passengers, so long as they are 
engaged in interstate commerce or in work so closely related 
thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.   
 (B) We then return to the Guidotti framework to 
determine whether the engaged-in-interstate-commerce 
inquiry can be resolved from the pleadings, and if so, whether 
Singh’s submissions in response to the motion to compel 
arbitration operate to place the issue in dispute.  Since neither 
the Amended Complaint nor incorporated documents suffice 
for determining whether Singh belongs to a class of workers 
that are engaged in interstate commerce or sufficiently related 
work, we will ultimately remand for the District Court to 
examine the issue, with instruction to permit limited discovery 
before entertaining further briefing.  If Uber chooses to reassert 
its motion after this discovery is completed, the District Court 
shall apply the summary judgment standard under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56 and decide only this aspect of the § 1 
residual clause inquiry, which will be dispositive as to whether 
the FAA applies.2   
                                                 
 2 Because the motion to dismiss the case and compel 
arbitration was filed before discovery, and this case involves 
consideration of a threshold issue concerning whether the FAA 
even applies, Judge Shwartz does not agree that the framework 
set forth in Guidotti is applicable but agrees that the case 
should be remanded to allow the parties to conduct discovery 





 And (C) we ultimately do not reach the remaining issues 
raised by the parties because they are contingent on the FAA’s 
applicability. 
A. Transportation Workers who Transport 
Passengers May be § 1 Exempt 
 
1. Workers who Transport Passengers May be § 1 
Exempt 
 Section 1 of the FAA provides that “nothing” in the 
FAA “shall apply” to “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 1.  In our en banc 
decision in Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical 
Radio & Machine Workers of America, (U.E.) Local 437, 207 
F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953), we held that, under the rule of 
ejusdem generis,3 the residual clause of this provision only 
includes those other classes of workers “who are actually 
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or 
in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect 
part of it.”  In so holding, we reaffirmed our previous decisions 
in Amalgamated Association Street Electric Railway & Motor 
Coach Employees of America, Local Div. 1210 v. Pennsylvania 
                                                 
foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of determining 
whether the FAA exemption applies.  
 3 This is a statutory canon through which, “when a 
statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general 
term, [the] general term is confined to covering subjects 
comparable to the specifics it follows.”  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. 




Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951) (“Greyhound 
I”) and Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated 
Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach 
Employees of America, Division 1063, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 
1952) (per curiam) (“Greyhound II”).  Those cases held that 
the collective bargaining agreement between a union and bus 
line employees qualified as a contract of employment of a class 
of workers engaged in interstate commerce.  See Greyhound I, 
192 F.2d at 313; Greyhound II, 193 F.2d at 328. 
 In Tenney, we had occasion to reconsider our holdings 
in Greyhound I and Greyhound II.  Then-Chief Judge Biggs 
concurred in the judgment, but proposed that we should 
overturn those decisions on two fronts:  first, he argued that a 
collective bargaining agreement should not be considered a 
contract of employment, and second, that the residual clause of 
§ 1 should encompass both those engaged in transporting 
goods in foreign or interstate commerce and those, such as 
manufacturing workers, that are engaged in the production of 
goods for interstate commerce.  Tenney, F.2d 454–55 (Biggs, 
C.J., concurring).  We did not adopt either view, but instead 
affirmed Greyhound I and Greyhound II, characterizing the bus 
line employees as “being directly engaged in the channels of 
interstate transportation just as are railroad workers.”  Id. at 
453 (emphasis added).    
 Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court reached the 
same conclusion, and held that the residual clause of § 1 only 
operates to exclude from FAA coverage “contracts of 
employment of transportation workers” who are engaged in 
interstate commerce.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001); see also Palcko v. Airborne Express, 
Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme 




analysis [in Tenney].”).  The Circuit City Court was presented 
with the question of whether the residual clause of § 1 applies 
to all contracts of employment, or simply those of 
transportation workers.  To resolve it, it took the textualist 
approach we applied in Tenney, reasoning that, because the 
phrase “any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate 
commerce” constitutes a residual clause following explicit 
references to “seamen” and “railroad employees,” the maxim 
of ejusdem generis requires that it be construed to only 
embrace “objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated 
by the preceding specific words.”  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 
114–15.  As such, the Court held that the residual clause of § 1 
only exempts the contracts of employment of transportation 
workers.  Id. at 119; see also New Prime, 139 S. Ct at 538 
(“In Circuit City, we acknowledged that ‘Section 1 exempts 
from the [Act] . . . contracts of employment of transportation 
workers.’” (citation omitted)).    
2. Uber Does Not Convince Us Otherwise 
 With the foregoing in tow, Uber endeavors to convince 
us that the residual clause of § 1 should not apply to 
transportation workers sufficiently engaged in interstate 
commerce, but rather only those who transport goods in 




 Uber’s preferred course is not the text.  On its face, 
nothing in the residual clause of § 1 suggests that it is limited 




transport passengers.  In fact, the text indicates the opposite.4  
Recall that the provision excludes “contracts of employment of 
. . . any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added), and that the 
decision to narrow this clause to only transportation workers is 
premised on the textual canon of interpretation, ejusdem 
generis.  In this context, this means that the residual clause of 
§ 1 only includes those workers that are engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce in a manner similar to seamen and railroad 
employees.   
 With that in mind, Uber cannot direct us to any 
contemporary statutes or sources that define the terms 
“seamen” and “railroad employees” to only include those who 
transport goods.  To the contrary, in its efforts to offer a 
rationale for why Congress might have created a carve-out for 
                                                 
 4 In this regard, we share our concurring colleague’s 
inclination that, standing alone, the term “commerce” does not 
inhere a goods-versus-passengers distinction.  But ending the 
analysis there would be inconsistent with our decision in 
Tenney as well as the Supreme Court’s in Circuit City.  Neither 
turned on the meaning of the term “commerce” in a vacuum.  
Indeed, had either done so, the residual clause of § 1 would 
likely not have been limited to the employment contracts of 
transportation workers.  This is obviously not the case, and 
ejusdem generis’s invocation is the culprit.  See Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 114–16 (rejecting the notion that §§ 1 and 2 are 
“coterminous” because “[c]onstruing the residual phrase to 
exclude all employment contracts fails to give independent 
effect to the statute’s enumeration of the specific categories of 





seamen and railroad employees, the Circuit City Court 
referenced two contemporary statutes:  the Transportation Act 
of 1920 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926.  Circuit City, 532 
U.S. at 121.  Each purported to resolve disputes between 
carriers and their employees and, in so purporting, defined 
“carrier” to include “sleeping car compan[ies],” which are 
railway passenger cars.5  Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. 
No. 66-152, § 300(1), 41 Stat. 456, 469; Railway Labor Act of 
1926, Pub. L. No. 69-257, § 1, 44 Stat. 577, 577 (codified and 
later repealed at 45 U.S.C. § 651).   
 In addition, the Supreme Court acknowledged the broad 
sweep of these terms in New Prime.  There, New Prime had 
argued that the term “contracts of employment” does not 
extend to independent contractor agreements.  New Prime, 139 
S.Ct at 538–39.  However, the residual clause of § 1 purports 
to apply to the contracts of employment of “any other class of 
workers,” which is indisputably broader than those of 
employees and suggests that independent-contractor 
agreements were to be encompassed.  Id. at 542.  To overcome 
                                                 
 5 The Transportation Act of 1920 and the Railway Labor 
Act of 1926 also each defined “carrier” to include “any carrier 
by railroad, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act” (“ICA”) 
excluding local electrical rails.  41 Stat. 456, § 300(1); 44 Stat. 
577, § 1, 46 U.S.C.§ 651 (repealed).  The provision of the ICA 
in turn applied “to any common carrier or carriers engaged in 
the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, 
or partly by railroad and partly by water . . .” between states.  






that, New Prime pointed out that § 1 enumerates the contracts 
of employment of “seamen” and “railroad employees,” which 
it argued included “only employees in 1925.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  The Court rejected this argument, characterizing it 
as “rest[ing] on a precarious premise,” because, “[a]t the time 
of the [FAA]’s passage,” even “shipboard surgeons who 
tended to injured sailors were considered ‘seamen’ . . . .”  Id. 
at 542–43.6  The Court also referenced the Transportation Act 
of 1920’s definition of “railroad employees” and the 1898 
Erdman Act’s “equally broad understanding” of the term, the 
latter of which encompassed “all persons actually engaged in 
any capacity in train operation or train service of any 
description.”  Id. at 543 n.12 (emphasis added).7   
                                                 
 6 The cases that the Court cited in support of this 
proposition also clearly contemplated the presence of seamen 
on passenger ships.  See The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d 201, 201–02 
(W.D.Wash.1926) (describing cooks, surgeons, and bartenders 
as seamen, and holding that musicians on a boat used for 
excursions were seamen); The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 
(S.D.N.Y. 1916) (discussing a case that “held that a warranty 
to carry ‘30 seamen besides passengers’ meant that the 30 
seamen included a cook, a surgeon, and other employe[e]s” 
(citation omitted)); Allan v. State S.S. Co., 30 N.E. 482, 483–
84 (1892) (discussing the duty arising from Great Britain’s 
Passenger Act of 1855 of “defendant[,] a common carrier of 
passengers,” to employ a shipboard surgeon with an 
appropriate supply of medicines). 
 7 As the Court explained, the Erdman Act was “enacted 
to address disruptive railroad strikes at the end of the 19th 




 Thus, if anything, a textual approach to the residual 
clause of § 1 suggests that it extends to both transportation 
workers who transport goods as well as those who transport 
passengers.  
ii.  
 Precedent also fails to give Uber succor on this point.  
All sides agree that, as it stands, our decisions in Tenney, 
Greyhound I, and Greyhound II are unequivocal that the 
residual clause of § 1 excludes the contracts of employment of 
transportation workers who transport passengers from the 
FAA.  Equally, Circuit City essentially affirmed our ruling in 
Tenney that the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA operates to 
exclude the contracts of employment of transportation 
workers.  And, to some extent, New Prime affirmed our 
Greyhound rulings that the term “contract of employment” 
includes more than employment contracts in the modern, strict 
sense.  New Prime Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 539 (explaining that, at 
the time of the FAA’s enactment, “dictionaries tended to treat 
‘employment’ more or less as a synonym for ‘work[,’ and] . . . 
did [not] distinguish between different kinds of work or 
workers.”).   
b.  
 So Uber clings to inapposite dicta and legislative 
history, to no avail.   
i.  
 It first ventures into Supreme Court dicta from Circuit 
City.  Specifically, in setting forth the issue presented on 




between the Ninth Circuit and most other circuits, including 
ours.  It described most circuits as having concluded that the 
residual clause of § 1 only excludes “transportation workers, 
defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce.’”  Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 112 (citations omitted).  The District Court doubled 
down on this characterization, and further asserted that “[t]o 
date, virtually every circuit having considered the issue has 
found that [the residual clause of § 1] only applies to those 
employees who are actually engaged in the movement of goods 
as opposed to the transportation of people, in interstate 
commerce.”  App. 17.   On this basis, the District Court sided 
with Uber and disregarded our precedent as outdated and 
unintentional.  See App. 18 n.8 (setting aside Greyhound I and 
Greyhound II as “primarily deal[ing] with the issue of whether 
a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a contract of 
employment—not whether employees who transport people, 
as opposed to goods, fall within the scope of [§ 1].”).   
 We disagree.    
 As an initial matter, although “we pay due homage to 
the Supreme Court’s well-considered dicta as pharoi that guide 
our rulings,” our Court is bound by the holdings of Supreme 
Court cases, not dicta.  IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l 
Partners, LLC., 438 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (“IFC”) 
(emphasis added).  In IFC, we rejected a party’s argument that 
the Supreme Court implicitly overturned our prior precedent 
because it referred to that decision as being on the wrong side 
of a circuit split.  Id. at 310–11.  Expelled in a footnote, we held 
that this was “hardly a well-considered dictum[, as it] merely 




 The Circuit City dicta Uber relies on is of the same 
token, for it also merely illustrates a circuit split.  The language 
appears in the section of the Court’s decision in which it 
clarifies the issue before it as being whether the residual clause 
of § 1 encompasses all contracts of employment, or only those 
of transportation workers.  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112–13.  
The Court set out the division among the circuits by explaining 
that, “[m]ost Courts of Appeals” had “conclude[d that] the 
exclusion provision is limited to transportation workers, 
defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce.’”  Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
and citations citation omitted).  But the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the provision “to exclude all contracts of 
employment from the reach of the FAA.”  Id.  The Supreme 
Court’s only mention of these Courts of Appeals decisions in 
the actual analysis is where the Court explains that its decision 
that the residual clause of § 1 only extends to transportation 
workers was in line with the majority view.  See id.  
 Further, unlike IFC, the Court ultimately determined 
that our precedent was on the right side of the split.  It cited the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Cole v. Burns International Security 
Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as indicating 
the position of most Courts of Appeals.  See Circuit City, 532 
U.S. at 119.  Notably, the portion of Cole that the Court 
references string cites the prior Courts of Appeals decisions 
that held the majority view, including our en banc decision in 
Tenney.  See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471.  The Supreme Court dicta 
relied on by Uber is thus too far removed from what we would 
characterize as well-considered.  Circuit City did not overrule 




 We are also not persuaded that any decisions by our 
sister circuits contradict ours in Tenney, Greyhound I, and 
Greyhound II.  Although Cole determined that the residual 
clause of § 1 did not extend to a security guard at a train station 
because he was not “engaged in the transportation of goods in 
interstate commerce,” none of the Court of Appeals decisions 
it cited held that the residual clause of § 1 only extended to 
those who transported goods, and, as we set out earlier, Tenney 
stood for the exact opposite proposition.  Rather, like Cole, our 
sister courts have only gone as far as to draw the line where 
Circuit City did, despite passing references to goods.   
 Indeed, in one form or another, all were confronted with 
the same question:  whether the residual clause of § 1 covered 
the contracts of employment of those who were not in the 
transportation industry at all.  See, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet 
Comput. Techs., 134 F.3d 1054, 1061 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(involving someone who provided technical support to 
computer system salespeople) (Cox, J., concurring); Rojas v. 
TK Communs., 87 F.3d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving a 
disc jockey at a radio station); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. 
Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 593–94, 596 (6th Cir. 1995) (involving the 
controlling shareholder and chairman of a utility company); 
O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 273–74 (4th Cir. 
1997) (involving a respiratory therapist at a hospital); 
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 52, 53 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (involving a consultant hired by a brokerage firm); 
Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 
AFL-CIO, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (involving a 
union representing the brewers in Milwaukee); Erving v. 
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 
1972) (involving Julius Erving, the professional basketball 




Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 2005) (involving a 
customer service representative for a transportation 
company)8; Hill v. Rent-A-Center., Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 
(11th Cir. 2005) (involving an account manager for a furniture 
and appliance rental business). 
ii.  
 As for legislative history, Uber returns us to Circuit 
City, where the Supreme Court suggested that Congress might 
have limited § 1 to seamen and railroad employees because 
there were statutory dispute resolution schemes already in 
place for such workers.  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 120–21.  
Based on this suggestion, Uber argues that the absence of an 
alternate dispute resolution scheme for Uber drivers means that 
                                                 
 8 Uber relies heavily on Lenz, pointing out its various 
references to “goods” in its analysis of whether a customer 
service representative for a transportation company was a 
transportation worker for purposes of FAA exemption.  431 
F.3d at 352–53.  Within the same analysis, the Lenz court 
quoted another circuit court’s statement that “[n]umerous 
courts” have defined “transportation workers” to include “bus 
drivers and truck drivers.”  Id. at 351 (quoting Am. Postal 
Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 
473 (11th Cir. 1987)).  This seeming contradiction simply 
demonstrates that the Lenz court, like all of the courts to 
paraphrase Circuit City’s “goods” language in similar 
circumstances, did not have the question of passengers versus 
cargo before it, and simply used “goods” as a convenient 




Congress did not intend § 1 to extend to such workers.  The 
problems are legion. 
 For one, prior to venturing into legislative history, 
Circuit City makes clear that its decision did not at all rely on 
this history, and cautioned against doing so where, as here, a 
textual analysis is determinative.  Id. at 119 (“As the 
conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we 
need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion 
provision.”).  It then expressly noted that “the legislative record 
on the § 1 exemption is quite sparse,” and comprises of 
testimony before a Senate subcommittee, as opposed to 
appearing in the official Senate and House Reports or arising 
in a debate on the floor of either chamber.  Id. at 120 (warning 
that legislative history is “far more [problematic] when we 
consult sources still more steps removed from the full Congress 
and speculate upon the significance of the fact that a certain 
interest group sponsored or opposed particular legislation”).   
 So, pressed by the respondent who argued that the 
Court’s holding “attribute[d] an irrational intent to Congress,” 
the Court merely speculated that one plausible explanation for 
what otherwise seems like an out-of-place limitation is that, as 
to these workers, Congress was certain that its commerce 
power would extend, since it had previously regulated them.  
Id. at 120–121.  Notably, “[b]y the time the FAA was passed, 
Congress had already enacted federal legislation providing for 
the arbitration of disputes between seamen and their 
employers.”  Id. at 121 (citations omitted); see also New Prime, 
139 S. Ct at 537 (characterizing this portion of § 1 as a “very 
particular qualification” that may be explained by the 
“prescribed alternative employment dispute resolution regimes 
for many transportation workers,” which Congress may not 




(quoting Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121)).  If attempting to infer 
Congress’ intent from testimony before a subcommittee of one 
chamber is “particularly problematic,” Circuit City, 532 U.S. 
at 119, doing so from mere judicial speculation is at least 
equally imprudent.  We refuse to go down that road.  Instead, 
we read the passage cited by Uber as merely combatting the 
argument that there is no plausible explanation for the residual 
clause of § 1 to be limited to transportation workers.   
 Another roadblock for Uber’s view is that Uber has 
never framed the issue as whether § 1 extends to Uber drivers 
specifically, but rather as whether it extends to transportation 
workers who transport passengers.  This is what the District 
Court focused on.  However, Circuit City’s reference to the 
dispute resolution schemes in place for “seamen” and “railroad 
employees” squarely cuts against the notion that the residual 
clause of § 1 only extends to those who transport goods.  As 
the Court acknowledged in New Prime, the statutes setting 
forth some of these schemes covered employees in the broadest 
sense, with no distinction between those engaged in 
transporting goods versus passengers.  See New Prime, 139 
S.Ct. at 539–40. 
 Worse yet, the rationale Circuit City offers as 
explaining why the residual clause of § 1 would be tethered to 
the enumerated clauses listing “seamen” and “railroad 
workers” suggests that the residual clause is not limited to only 
those workers for whom a dispute resolution scheme exists.  
On this point, Circuit City explains that, “[i]t would be rational 
for Congress to ensure that workers in general would be 
covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for itself 
more specific legislation for those engaged in transportation.”  
532 U.S. at 121 (citation omitted).  It then proceeds to describe 




legislation, recognizing that the amendment was to include “air 
carriers and their employees.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Setting 
aside that air carriers and their employees are invariably 
engaged in the transportation of passengers, this explanation 
suggests that air carriers and their employees were covered by 
§ 1 even before the Railway Labor Act was amended—that is, 
before a dispute resolution scheme existed for them.9       
                                                 
 9 Uber attributed a contrary reading to an unreported 
Northern District of California decision, Veliz v. Cintas 
Corporation, 2004 WL 2452851 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  But Veliz 
did not suggest that the existence of special arbitration 
legislation should be dispositive.  Rather, as we conclude, this 
decision recognized that the terms “seamen” and “railroad 
employees” are broad.  See id. at *4 (relying on the Jones Act 
and Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872 definition of 
“seamen” to conclude that “seamen, whether they are in the 
business of goods or not, have been found to be exempted from 
arbitration under the FAA § 1”); id. (concluding that the 
definition of railroad employees “appears to be broad[,] . . . 
because of subsequent judicial interpretation of the term . . . in 
other federal statutes, such as the Transportation Act of 1920 
and Railway Labor Act of 1926”).   
 As a result, Veliz merely suggests that the existence of 
special arbitration legislation be one of the factors in 
determining whether the residual clause of § 1 applies, in 
conjunction with a non-exhaustive list of other characteristics 
thought to be possessed by seamen and/or railroad employees.  
See id. at *7.  Some of these characteristics speak to a factual 
universe that is beyond our own.  See id. (suggesting that courts 





* * * * * 
 In the end, we remain unswayed by Uber’s attempt to 
drive us towards its imagined sunset.  Consistent with our 
decisions in Tenney, Greyhound I, and Greyhound II, we hold 
that the residual clause of § 1 of the FAA may operate to 
exclude from FAA coverage the contracts of employment of 
all classes of transportation workers, so long as they are 
engaged in interstate commerce, or in work so closely related 
thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.   
B. The District Court Will Decide in the First Instance 
Whether the Class of Workers to Which Singh 
Belongs are Engaged in Interstate Commerce 
 
1. Discovery is Warranted 
 Our analysis stops here.  The District Court did not 
determine whether Singh’s class of transportation workers is 
engaged in interstate commerce or sufficiently related work, 
                                                 
interstate commerce).  Interestingly, however, three of the five 
Veliz factors that we can determine on the record before us cut 
in favor of concluding that the residual clause of § 1 may 
extend to drivers like Singh.  See id. (consisting of whether “the 
vehicle itself is essential to the commercial enterprise of the 
defendant-employer,” “[t]he nexus between the employee’s 
job and the vehicle,” “[w]hether the employee is employed in 
the transportation industry,” “[w]hether the employee is 
directly responsible for the transporting of goods in interstate 
commerce,” and “[w]hether . . . special arbitration legislation 
already existed at the time the FAA was enacted” (internal 




nor could it.  At this stage, a court may only make that 
determination if the complaint and incorporated documents 
suffice.  If not, or if so and Singh’s opposition to the motion to 
compel arbitration places the issue in dispute, discovery must 
be allowed before entertaining further briefing on the question. 
 The latter course is warranted here.  Unlike the issue of 
whether Uber drivers transport goods, the pleadings say little 
about whether the class of transportation workers to which 
Singh belongs are engaged in interstate commerce or 
sufficiently related work.  The Amended Complaint is devoid 
of any facts pertaining to the issue.  In addition, Singh’s 
submissions in opposition to the motion further place the issue 
in dispute—in his affidavit, he avers that he frequently 
transported passengers on the highway across state lines, 
between New York and New Jersey.  Singh Decl. ¶ 28, 29, 
App. 34.10   
 
                                                 
 10 Uber sought to counter this averment by representing 
to the Court that “the undisputed evidence demonstrates Uber 
operates on a localized, city-by-city basis.”  Appellee Suppl. 
Br. 3–4 (citing App. 36).  However, Uber’s only support for 
this averment is the affidavit it submitted, which merely states 
that “[t]he Uber App is available to riders and transportation 
providers in over 150 cities across the country,” Colman Decl. 
¶ 5, App. 36, and is beyond the scope of what a court may 




2. We Reject the Parties’ Efforts to Restrict the Engaged-
In-Interstate Commerce Inquiry to Their Contract or 
General Knowledge about the Nature of the Work 
 At argument, each party suggested that there was ample 
basis to find in their respective favors.  Singh suggested that 
we look to what the contract of employment between the 
parties contemplates as determinative on the engage-in-
interstate-commerce inquiry.  He then argued that the Rasier 
Agreement implicitly, but fairly, contemplated a relationship 
with drivers across all fifty states, and that encompassed 
interstate travel.  Uber, on the other hand, suggested that we 
look to whether the character of the work performed by the 
workers was inherently local (presumably from our general 
knowledge about these drivers), and argued that this is the case 
with drivers like Singh, even if they cross state lines from time 
to time.   
 We cannot endorse either view.  Although § 1 excludes 
the “contracts of employment” of certain workers, nothing 
suggests that those contracts ought to be dispositive as to what 
constitutes those workers.  The Supreme Court’s efforts in New 
Prime and Circuit City to determine what constituted seamen 
and railroad employees are instructive on this point.  In both 
instances, the Court did not resort to the employment contract, 
but rather contemporary dictionaries and statutes that 
purported to define these workers.  We recognize that the 
inquiry regarding § 1’s residual clause asks a court to look to 
classes of workers rather than particular workers and is thus 
materially different than the Supreme Court’s efforts to define 
seamen and railroad employees.  But this difference does not 




must its analysis hinge on any one particular factor, such as the 
local nature of the work.11   
 The inquiry remains whether Singh belongs to a class of 
transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce or in 
work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part 
of it.  This inquiry can be informed by various factors.  The 
District Court may thus be equipped with a wide variety of 
sources, including, but not limited to and in no particular order, 
the contents of the parties’ agreement(s), information 
regarding the industry in which the class of workers is engaged, 
information regarding the work performed by those workers, 
                                                 
 11 Uber referenced the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. as supporting its suggestion, and to 
argue that a ruling in Singh’s favor would trigger a circuit split.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit was express that the residual 
clause of § 1 did not apply in Hill because the employee at 
issue—an account manager at Rent-A-Center—“[was] not a 
transportation industry worker.”  398 F.3d at 1288.  This was 
premised on the fact that the account manager’s transportation 
activities were incidental.  Id. at 1289–90.  The opposite is true 
here—if anything is clear, it is that Uber drivers’ transportation 
activities are more than incidental.  It is the extent to which 
their activities constitute engagement in interstate commerce 
that is the question.  On this question then, the notion of 
incidental interstate travel does us no good.  This is because, 
even if we definitively drew the line at incidental interstate 
travel (rather than viewing that as one, or even a primary 
factor), the Amended Complaint and Rasier Agreement do not 
provide us with the requisite facts to determine if incidental 
travel is in fact what the class of transportation workers at issue 




and various texts—i.e., other laws, dictionaries, and 
documents—that discuss the parties and the work. 
 We will therefore proceed with remanding this issue to 
the District Court, along with instruction that it permit 
discovery on the question before entertaining further briefing.   
C. Remaining Issues 
 In one way or another, Singh’s arguments that the 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable because of the Seventh 
Amendment, the NJWHL, and New Jersey law on 
unconscionability turn on the FAA’s applicability.  We 
therefore decline the parties’ invitation for us to opine on these 
issues and leave it to the District Court to address any 
remaining arguments it deems appropriate, once it determines 
whether the FAA applies.   
 In that vein, we note that the District Court previously 
found the delegation clause to be enforceable, and it 
recognized that the clause reserved questions of arbitrability 
for an arbitrator to decide.  See App. 28.  But the Court’s 
opinion suggests that the only question it viewed as one of 
arbitrability was “whether the parties’ disputes [fell] within the 
scope of” their agreement to arbitrate.  Id.  Uber’s opening brief 
properly takes issue with this narrow reading of the Rasier 
Agreement’s delegation clause.  See Rasier Agreement § 
15.3(i), App. 56–57 (delegating “disputes arising out of or 
relating to interpretation or application of [the] Arbitration 
Provision, including enforceability, revocability, or validity”).  
We instruct the District Court that, where the FAA is held to 
apply, all other questions must be reserved for an arbitrator 




case of the § 1 exemption/exclusion issue) or is not subject to 
an enforceable delegation clause.      
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
order entered by the District Court and remand for further 




PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
 
I agree with the majority’s judgment and much of its 
reasoning. I write separately, however, to explain why Uber’s 
proposed goods-versus-passenger distinction does not track the 
plain language of § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 




This appeal asks whether § 1’s residual clause—“any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce”—includes workers who transport other people, or 
only workers who transport physical goods. The majority holds 
that it includes all transportation workers, no matter who (or 
what) they transport. I concur, but I would reach this 
conclusion for a different, simpler reason.1 
                                              
1 The majority asserts that this Court answered this 
question long ago, citing three of our decisions from the early 
1950s. See Maj. Op. 14–15 (citing Amalgamated Ass’n of St., 
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp., Local Div. 1210 v. Pa. 
Greyhound Lines (“Greyhound I”), 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 
1951); Pa. Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. 
Ry. & Motor Coach Emp., Div. 1063 (“Greyhound II”), 193 
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952); Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. 
Radio & Mach. Workers, (U.E.) 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 
1953)). I disagree that these cases answer the specific question 
presented here.  
Greyhound I addressed whether a collective bargaining 
agreement was a “contract of employment” under § 1’s 
exemption. 192 F.2d at 313. We held that it was. Id. We also 
noted that, “while the situation existing in cases of seamen and 
railroad employees clarifies the meaning of the statute[,] its 
terms also include ‘any other classes of workers’ in interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 313–14. The labor union of bus-line 
employees, we said, was “[s]uch a class.” Id. at 314. Three 
months later, in Greyhound II, we addressed the same question 
for a “similar contract and a similar class of workers,” and 
compelled the same result. 193 F.2d at 328.  
Tenney addressed the issue decided nearly fifty years 




When we interpret a statute, we start with its text. See, 
e.g., Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 
2017). Section 1 exempts from the FAA’s reach “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 
U.S.C. § 1. On its face, nothing in this text states any sort of 
goods-passengers distinction. 
 
Uber suggests that the phrase “engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce” is limited to the transportation of only 
                                              
are engaged in the manufacture of goods for commerce and 
plant maintenance incidental thereto, are to be regarded as a 
‘class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’ 
within the meaning of the exclusionary clause.” See 207 F.2d 
at 452. Presaging the Supreme Court in Circuit City, we held 
that the residual clause “include[s] only those other classes of 
workers who are likewise engaged directly in commerce[.]” Id. 
And that meant “only those other classes of workers who are 
actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign 
commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in 
practical effect part of it.” Id. In so holding, we distinguished 
the two Greyhound cases, “the bus line employees in those 
cases being directly engaged in the channels of interstate 
transportation just as are railroad workers.” Id. at 453. 
None of these cases addressed the specific goods-
versus-passengers question presented here. At most, they 
might have assumed an answer. But it is nowhere evident that 
the parties in those cases ever crossed swords on this issue, 
which makes dictum of any discussion or implication from us 
on the point. Nor did we state or imply that we had forever 
settled the limits of § 1’s residual clause. So although generally 
we are bound by earlier precedential decisions of this Court, I 
would not turn sixty-year-old assumptions into binding 
precedent. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 
(2006) (“[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case 
in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.”); Lopez 
v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999) (“[T]his Court is 
not bound by its prior assumptions.”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993) (holding that when the Court has 
“never squarely addressed the issue, and [has] at most assumed 





material goods. But that is nowhere in the provision’s plain 
language. Instead, Uber would have us impliedly limit the 
meaning of “commerce” in § 1 to the transportation of only 
physical goods. That argument fails. 
 
First, the term “commerce” is not normally limited to 
the transportation of only physical goods, especially when 
linked to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.2 See 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (“[I]t is 
settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is 
‘commerce’, within the meaning of that provision.”); United 
States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423 (1919) (“[C]ommerce has 
been held to include the transportation of persons and property 
no less than the purchase, sale and exchange of 
commodities.”); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 
(1913) (“Commerce among the states, we have said, consists 
of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes 
the transportation of persons and property.”).3  
 
Second, Uber’s interpretation would give “commerce” 
a different meaning in § 1 than it has in § 2. The latter invokes 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to set the broad reach of 
                                              
2 This was the dominant understanding of “commerce” 
when Congress passed the FAA in 1925. See, e.g., Commerce, 
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary & Concise Encyclopedia (8th ed. 
1914) (“The term ‘commerce’ comprehends more than a mere 
exchange of goods; it embraces commercial intercourse in all 
its branches, including transportation of passengers[.]”); 
Commerce, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) 
(“Intercourse by way of trade and traffic between different 
peoples or states and the citizens or inhabitants thereof, 
including … the transportation of persons as well as of goods, 
both by land and by sea.”); Henry C. Black, Handbook of 
American Constitutional Law § 104, at 189 (2d ed. 1897) 
(“[Commerce] is not limited to the transportation of freight, but 
extends equally to passenger traffic.”). 
3 In fact, the issue here is analogous to that presented 
long ago in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). There, the 
Supreme Court held that “commerce” is more than the mere 
“interchange of commodities,” but includes passenger 




the FAA: “A written provision in … a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy….” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added); see Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) 
(holding that, in § 2, the phrase “involving commerce” shows 
Congress’s “intent to exercise [its] commerce power to the 
full”). Section 1, in turn, carves out certain contracts from the 
FAA’s scope: “nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts of employment of … any other class of workers 
engaged in … interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis 
added).  
 
The Supreme Court has ascribed different meanings to 
the modifiers “involving” in § 2 compared with “engaged in” 
in § 1—the latter reflecting a “narrower” exercise of 
Congress’s power—but the nature of the “commerce” in both 
sections is the same. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 115, 118 (2001) (“The plain meaning of the words 
‘engaged in commerce’ is narrower than the more open-ended 
formulations ‘affecting commerce’ and ‘involving 
commerce.’” (citation omitted)). Indeed, it must be the same 
because the Court held the subject constant to interpret the 
differing modifiers. See id. at 115–17. And rightly so, given 
that identical words in the same statute usually have identical 
meanings. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 294 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005)); United States v. Torres, 383 
F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
Uber concedes (as it must) that “commerce” in § 2 
includes the transportation of passengers. (Otherwise, Uber 
would be unable to invoke the FAA in the first place.) Having 
thus conceded, Uber undermines its contention that 
“commerce” in § 1 does not also include passenger-
transporting activities. In short, the plain language of the FAA 




After deciding that passenger-transporting drivers may 
fit within § 1’s exemption, the majority declares that its 
analysis has ended. Yet the majority continues in section 




remanding: whether Singh belongs to a “class of workers 
engaged in … interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. The 
majority says this question “can be informed by various 
factors,” and directs the District Court to permit discovery 
“before entertaining further briefing.” Maj. Op. 29. In my 
view, this discussion is unmoored from relevant precedent, 
tends to undermine settled principles of arbitration, and may 
unnecessarily cloud the remaining issues on remand. So I do 
not join section III.B.2 of the majority’s opinion, but write 
separately to make two points. 
 
First, I disagree that the parties must jump right into 
discovery on remand. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that “[t]he [FAA] calls for a summary and speedy 
disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration 
clauses.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983); see id. at 22 (noting “Congress’s 
clear intent, in the [FAA], to move the parties to an arbitrable 
dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily 
as possible.”). In light of this overarching goal and the parties’ 
clear agreement to arbitrate their disputes, if there exists a valid 
alternative basis on which the District Court could compel 
arbitration, it may be more efficient to decide that question 
first, before allowing discovery on the § 1 issue. See, e.g., 
Palcko v. Airborne Exp., Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(enforcing FAA-exempt arbitration agreement under state 
law); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (“[W]e have little doubt that, even if an arbitration 
agreement is outside the FAA, the agreement still may be 
enforced and the arbitrator’s award still may be subject to 
judicial review.”); Valdes v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 292 F. 
Supp. 2d 524, 528–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting cases); 
Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Local Union No. 560, Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 443 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1971) (“In our view, the 
effect of Section 1 is merely to leave the arbitrability of 
disputes in the excluded categories as if the Arbitration Act had 
never been enacted.”). 
 
Second, our decision here does not allow for wide-
ranging discovery whenever the § 1 exemption is at issue. The 
majority seems equivocal on this point—describing the 
relevant inquiry as both “restricted” and informed by “a wide 




makes clear that any discovery on factual predicates to 
arbitration must be a narrow, focused examination. See, e.g., 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22–23 (allowing “only restricted 
inquiry into factual issues”); Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764, 774 (3d Cir. 2013) (allowing 
only “limited discovery” on a “narrow issue” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Blair v. Scott 
Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 609 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[D]iscovery is ordinarily not undertaken at such an early 
stage of a proceeding that is governed by an arbitration 
agreement.”). 
 
The need to limit any pre-arbitration discovery is 
amplified here because of the shifted burden of proof and the 
open legal question of what it means to belong to a “class of 
workers engaged in … interstate commerce” under § 1. In 
Guidotti, for example, the discovery focused on whether the 
parties had specifically agreed to the arbitration clause at issue. 
That was a well-defined factual question governed by definite 
state-law contract principles. See 716 F.3d at 780. In that and 
similar situations, the burden of proof stays with the party 
seeking arbitration, which provides a natural incentive for 
efficient discovery and motions practice. See, e.g., Ashbey v. 
Archstone Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 
2015).  
 
Here, by contrast, things are reversed. Singh bears the 
burden on remand to show why the District Court should 
should not compel arbitration under the FAA, which may 
create inefficient incentives in discovery. See Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (“[T]he party 
resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims 
at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.”); Gay v. CreditInform, 
511 F.3d 369, 379 (3d Cir. 2007); Johnson v. W. Suburban 
Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2000). And the contours 
of the § 1 question—whether Singh belongs to a “class of 
workers engaged in … interstate commerce”—remain 
undefined: Singh has not yet attempted to define the relevant 
§ 1 “class of workers,” and his affidavit that triggers our 
extension of Guidotti asserts only that he drove passengers 




For these reasons, although I concur in the judgment 
and agree with much of the majority opinion, I do not join 
section III.B.2. 
